America’s Drone Delusion: Why the Lessons of Ukraine Don’t Apply to a Conflict With China (Paid article. Can read for free if you sign up as a member)
- Summary meme created by ChatGPT. The core point is that the depth of the battlespace (strategic depth) and the combat dynamics are different.
Introducing this decent column contributed by Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) in Foreign Affairs magazine.
The Russia-Ukraine war changed the paradigm of modern infantry combat. Early on, Ukraine's TB2s were popping the tops off Russian tanks, stalling the initial offensive, and recently, small wired/wireless FPV drones have been sweeping the battlefield—to the point where up to 70% of casualties on certain fronts are caused by drones. Because of this, the US Army is talking about adopting hundreds of thousands to a million drones over the next two to three years. This 'drones are the future!' kind of blind, unquestioning drone mania is slowly creeping up.
However, the argument is that the reason drones are thriving in the ROK-Ukraine war is due to that conflict's unique battlespace environment. Drones are pretty useless in the Pacific Theater, which is what the US really needs to prepare for, and over-concentrating on drones could weaken the advantages the US currently holds against China.
The Russia-Ukraine war has 1) a long front line from Kharkiv to Kherson with low troop density, 2) a situation of mutual air denial where neither side has air supremacy, and 3) neither side has been able to perform large-scale combined arms maneuver warfare since mid-2023 after heavy losses of elite units and armored divisions in the early stages of the war. As a result, the combat dynamics shifted to small-scale infantry skirmishes supported by small tank/artillery/drone units. Under these conditions, small quadcopter drones were extremely effective. Yet, even in this battlespace, small drones were only good for attrition against troops hidden in open trenches or moving in the field—they didn't really help much in attacking protected strongholds. Ukraine lost Chasiv Yar not because of drones, but because of glide bombs being dropped by Su-34 Fullbacks from behind the front line.
- Glide bomb attached to a Russian aircraft pylon ( https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/images-delta/comment/military-balance-blog/2024/03/886x486-russian-glide-bombs.png )
In contrast, any anticipated conflict in the Pacific Theater will center primarily on air and sea combat, and ground combat will likely be limited to Taiwan or nearby islands. Victory in this war depends on the ability to rapidly and consistently project overwhelming air and naval firepower onto key points at decisive moments, not on winning ground battles. Of course, the Taiwanese army absolutely needs to build up drone warfare or anti-drone capabilities to deter landing PLA forces, but these capabilities are useless for the US Air Force and Navy.
The strategic depth of the Pacific Theater is truly vast, and the short range of US Navy and Air Force fighters is a problem, forcing tankers to approach dangerously close to combat zones. In such a theater, FPV drones, which max out at about 15 miles range, can do almost nothing in the crucial initial stages of the war.
Because of this, although China has a truly massive drone industry, they are focusing not on expanding drone forces but on increasing high-performance weapons, and their numbers already exceed the US, even if performance isn't fully proven. China is expected to have about 1,000 J-20s by the 2030s, is building dozens of destroyers and cruisers, and their air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles already surpass US performance in some key areas. In contrast, the US, suffering from budget shortages and industrial capacity decline, is already falling behind in the numerical competition; the number of F-35As delivered in 2025 was only 48, and future delivery numbers won't increase. The F-47 will only appear in the early 2030s, and the US Navy's F/A-XX will come even later (assuming the program isn't canceled), by which time the Chinese J-36, J-XDS, and J-50 series currently in development will have already emerged.
- J-20 ( https://cdn.i-scmp.com/sites/default/files/styles/1200x800/public/images/methode/2018/11/14/141fc99a-e6f1-11e8-bfde-9434090d4df7_1280x720_040248.JPG?itok=_TZYxfez )
- J-36 ( https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/J-36-Fighter-from-China-1.jpg )
Not just fighters, the numerical gap in AWACS forces—the core of modern warfare—is starting to widen. China has about 60 AWACS aircraft and is producing more, but the US Air Force only has 16, which are the 707 platform E-3G Sentries. Plans to replace the E-3G with the E-7A were canceled by the current administration's Secretary of Defense, and while Congress revived it, significant delays are unavoidable, meaning the US will be inferior in airborne sensors, networking, and battlefield management nodes compared to China for the next 10+ years. Of course, both China and the US are pursuing space-based sensor and network capabilities, but it's too soon for them to replace AWACS entirely.
- KJ-500 ( https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/KJ-500.jpg/1280px-KJ-500.jpg )
Ultimately, the argument is that to prepare for the China threat, the US needs to focus on closing the widening gap in areas where it currently leads—fighters, bombers, warships, submarines, air-to-air/air-to-ground munitions—and shouldn't waste resources on mass production drones.
Adding my two cents: they only compared it to the Pacific War here, but even looking at the Israel-Hamas conflict happening concurrently with the Russia-Ukraine war, FPV drones didn't exactly dominate the battlefield. While front-line infantry combat has drastically improved in surveillance, striking power, and networking scope since drones emerged, falling for drone universalism and siphoning resources from more important high-end weapons won't end well...
When I see the policy decisions of the Trump DoD—canceling the problematic Constellation-class FFG only to use Coast Guard cutters (who knows how much they'll improve them), dithering over the E-7A introduction, and the CVN-68 USS Nimitz just finished its final deployment but its replacement is delayed—while they pump astronomical resources into the Golden Dome [expensive, localized defense projects], I get worried... but hey, the Americans will figure it out ㅋㅋㅋ
The following is the full text translated by ChatGPT. I added the emphasis.
**America's Drone Delusion: Why the Lessons of Ukraine Don't Apply to a Conflict With China** *By Justin Bronk December 15, 2025* (Photo: US soldiers prepare a drone for flight training at Hohenfels, Germany. Staff Sgt. Chandler Coats / Reuters) Justin Bronk is a Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the United Kingdom. Nearly four years into the fighting, few elements of Russia’s war in Ukraine have garnered as much attention among Western militaries as the rapid spread of drone warfare. Since 2023, both sides have deployed millions of cheap, quadcopter-style drones across the front. In some sectors of the front line, these small drones now account for up to 70 percent of battlefield casualties. Meanwhile, Russia conducts nightly long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities using thousands of propeller-driven, single-use attack drones, the Geran-2 and Geran-3, and Ukraine has used its own range of single-use attack drones to regularly hit Russian bases, factories, and energy infrastructure. Observing these developments, many Western defense strategists have made urgent calls to shift military priorities. In June, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order to accelerate drone production. Since then, the US Department of Defense has enacted several policy changes to rapidly integrate low-cost drones into the US arsenal, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth urging the United States to establish 'drone dominance.' Meanwhile, in the private sector, software and AI companies that have heavily invested in developing unmanned military technology, such as Anduril, Palantir, and Shield AI, are competing for lucrative new defense contracts. It is certainly true that small unmanned aerial systems have fundamentally changed how infantry combat is conducted, and it is clear that the US Army and other services are lagging behind Russia and China in these capabilities—and more worryingly—in counter-unmanned aerial vehicle technology. However, the assumption that acquiring AI-powered drones at scale will strengthen US defense against China is flawed. First and foremost, the lessons learned from the Ukraine war—fundamentally an attritional, inconclusive struggle between two land-centric armies—often do not directly apply to other types of conflicts. Given the realities of Beijing’s military assets and the nature of a potential clash in the Indo-Pacific, such a conflict would be governed by entirely different factors. Despite possessing the world’s largest and most advanced drone industry, China has actually prioritized manned military equipment. If the United States concentrates too heavily on drone development and acquisition, it risks losing the faint advantage it retains over the People’s Liberation Army in the high-end air and naval capabilities that will dominate an Indo-Pacific conflict. **Why Drones Dominate in the Donbas** Over the past few years, military analysts and defense industry executives have fixated on what Western militaries should learn from Ukraine’s surprising defense against Russia. One result of this focus has been an excessive influx of new defense products and technologies being marketed to Western militaries as “transformative,” based on vaguely described case studies of combat use in Ukraine. Indeed, many of these systems, especially Western-made drones developed by tech startups, have proven ineffective or outright failed on the battlefield in the face of constant electronic warfare and harsh environmental conditions from both Russian and Ukrainian sides. The greater problem, however, is that the Ukraine war possesses several characteristics that will not apply to US and Chinese forces in an Indo-Pacific context. Russia’s ongoing ground invasion of Ukraine has created a thinly manned front line stretching over 600 miles, from Kharkiv province in the north to Kherson in the south. Since neither side has secured air superiority, airpower has been far less important than in other modern conflicts. Following catastrophic losses of armored divisions and other elite units on both sides during the war’s initial phases, neither Russia nor Ukraine has been able to conduct large-scale combined-arms maneuver warfare since mid-2023. As a result, both armies have been forced to rely heavily on small infantry units combined with tank, artillery, and drone support to tentatively assault fixed defensive lines through minefields. Advances have been extremely slow and costly in both directions. Under these conditions, short-range, light, inexpensive, and mass-produced quadcopter-style drones have proven highly effective. Especially as both sides face growing shortages of ammunition and launchers for conventional and long-range rocket artillery, they have relied on cheap drones to attrit and suppress enemy supplies and tactical movements within 6–12 miles of the front. By 2024, front-line fighting has indeed come to be dominated by ever more drones and the continuous development of new technologies, such as fiber-optic drones and AI-assisted terminal guidance video. Counter-drone defenses, such as nets, electronic jamming, and specialized shotgun and autocannon ammunition, have also become vital and are rapidly evolving. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the spread of drone warfare is the primary reason for the Ukrainian military’s failure to hold key strongholds against Russian forces in 2024 and 2025. Instead, the decisive factor has been the heavy glide bombs that Russia drops onto the front line weekly, using Su-34 fighter-bombers. These glide bombs, ranging from 500 kg to 3000 kg, can destroy even deep, fortified combat positions and kill entrenched troops far more effectively than small drones. Ukraine still lacks effective means to intercept the launch aircraft dropping the bombs from more than 40 miles behind the front line. Although drones cause most of the routine attrition against moving infantry and vehicles at and near the front, concentrated glide bomb attacks pose a far greater threat to troops deployed in trenches. Russia’s constant glide bomb strikes have proven extremely difficult for Ukrainian forces attempting to hold heavily fortified strategic points, such as the hilltop city of Chasiv Yar in Donetsk Oblast. **The Pacific Difference** In stark contrast to the operational environment in Ukraine, a potential conflict between US and Chinese PLA forces would primarily unfold in the air and at sea, with ground forces combat likely confined to key islands such as Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China). In this context, US success will depend on the ability to rapidly and repeatedly project overwhelming air and naval firepower onto key points at decisive moments. This means projecting power across thousands of miles of ocean, against a multitude of highly advanced Chinese missile, aerial, and naval threats. Such operations require highly trained personnel operating sophisticated fighters, bombers, and warships, performing mutually supporting actions in finely synchronized joint operations. In other words, this conflict would involve entirely different types of forces and equipment than those used by Ukraine or Russia in the current war. Drones would still likely play a significant role in ground and amphibious operations in an Indo-Pacific conflict. For example, Taiwan would benefit greatly if it could deploy hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of small drones to deter PLA forces landing on its shores. It would also be essential for Taiwanese forces to possess counter-drone capabilities that can continuously intercept and jam the PLA’s single-use attack and reconnaissance drones flying from the mainland or nearby ships. However, these unmanned systems would do nothing to provide the air superiority and ultimate naval support that the US Air Force and Navy must provide, which will need to project power from Guam or other distant US bases. The distances in the Indo-Pacific are harsh. The greatest weakness of current 'sophisticated' US fighters—the F-22, F-35, and F/A-18E/F—against the growing Chinese threat is not that they are expensive and relatively few in number. It is their comparatively limited range. With combat radii of only 350 to 600 miles, these fighters must rely on aerial refueling to reach conflict areas from viable bases, which means tankers must approach dangerously close to Chinese missile and fighter threats during a conflict. Small drones cannot solve this problem. Even the longest-range fiber-optic cable-equipped first-person view drones commonly used in Ukraine have a maximum range of about 15 miles, and most small FPVs have far less. In other words, the weapon system that most distinguishes the fighting in Ukraine from previous interstate wars would be almost irrelevant in the decisive initial phases of a conflict between China and the United States. The US has a shrinking and increasingly aging conventional force structure. Even if small drones could be rapidly delivered over the required distance, no type of drone currently used by either side in Ukraine can effectively defend US forces from a Chinese attack. Beijing already operates thousands of advanced ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, which would be used to strike US forward bases, aircraft carriers, tankers, and other key large assets. To counter these threats, US forces would inevitably rely on multi-million dollar missile defense systems such as Patriot PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3. Intercepting hundreds of increasingly capable Chinese fighters would also require advanced air-to-air missiles in large quantities, such as the AIM-260 JATM, AIM-174B, and AIM-120D AMRAAM. These missiles are needed in bulk, whether launched from manned fighters or future AI-powered unmanned systems. Small drones cannot intercept fighters operating at high altitude and speed. Furthermore, many types of unmanned systems that could be much more useful in the Indo-Pacific would themselves incur immense costs. For example, stealth Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), automated or AI-powered unmanned fighters designed to accompany and support traditional fighters, are projected to cost $20–$30 million per airframe. Even less ambitious designs intended to serve merely as forward sensors and weapons-launch 'trucks' cost millions of dollars. While their development and acquisition could certainly offer significant advantages, their cost prevents them from being regularly 'swarmed' or expended at scale. Operating these systems also requires large human resources dedicated to preparing, recovering, maintaining, and deploying them, personnel who must be redeployed from other missions. CCAs, too, will not fundamentally change the US's relative standing, as the PLA is developing similar systems. Simpler disposable attack, decoy, or forward jamming drones can be produced relatively cheaply and could play a vital role within complex joint strike packages. However, even these drones are likely to cost hundreds of thousands of dollars apiece to achieve the necessary range and performance. AI-powered swarm behavior in flight could enhance the effectiveness of these drones or missiles in certain tactical situations, but the required data links and processing power will further increase the unit cost, limiting their quantity. Weapons serving similar purposes—intelligent long-range attack, deception, and forward jamming—have existed for decades in the form of cruise missiles and decoys like the ADM-160 MALD-X. The problem is not that these existing means cannot perform the role, but that the United States does not possess enough of them. **The Challenge of Battle Scale** For the United States, it is an inescapable reality that a conflict with a major peer competitor will demand a totally different allocation of resources than the overseas interventions and counter-insurgency operations conducted in recent decades. Any clash with China would require vast stockpiles of ammunition, spare parts, medical supplies, and other logistical essentials. Currently, Washington faces severe shortages in key areas of long-range strike, anti-ship, and interceptor missiles, and most allies suffer even greater deficiencies. The US also has a shrinking and increasingly aging conventional force structure, the result of more than a decade of deferring modernization of the Air Force and Navy during the Global War on Terror. The immense cost of restoring “battle scale” to conventional high-end military systems has led many defense analysts and policymakers to almost desperately seek ways to achieve “cheap scale” through AI-powered technologies, particularly drones. By contrast, the PLA is growing in both quantity and quality. Despite having the world’s largest and most advanced drone manufacturing industrial base, China’s primary military focus is on acquiring more manned fighters, large warships, and advanced missile systems. The PLA Air Force is expected to field around 1,000 of China’s premier fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, by 2030. China is also building dozens of advanced destroyers and cruisers annually, alongside hundreds of advanced anti-ship, long-range surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles. Notably, many of these Chinese systems, especially in the air-to-air and surface-to-air missile fields, have already begun to surpass the performance of their US counterparts in some key areas. Almost all of this production is for the PLA, not export customers like Pakistan, and is likely to be used en masse in any attempt to seize Taiwan or in other conflicts in the East and South China Seas. In contrast, while Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter is being produced at a slightly faster rate than China’s J-20A and J-20S, only a fraction of that production is being purchased by the US military. The US Air Force purchased only 48 F-35As in 2025 and plans to purchase fewer for the remainder of the current decade. While the US Navy and Marine Corps acquire other variants, most of Lockheed Martin's current production goes to US allies in Europe and Asia. The next-generation F-47 fighter, projected to cost over $300 million per airframe, is not expected to be fielded as an operational combat asset for the US Air Force until the early 2030s. The US Navy’s equivalent next-generation program, designated F/A-XX, will be introduced even later, assuming the plan continues. However, by that time, China’s next-generation J-36, J-XDS, and J-50 families, which are already undergoing flight testing, are likely to be operational. While they may lag slightly behind the F-47 in per-airframe performance, they will likely be produced at a faster rate and in larger numbers. There are no easy solutions to the challenge posed by China's increasing military capabilities. Another area where China's high-end capabilities are already surpassing the United States is in Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. These aircraft are critical assets that greatly amplify the combat power of air forces and joint forces by providing long-range, wide-area radar detection, battlefield management, and targeting designation. The PLA already possesses about 60 modern AWACS aircraft, equipped with the latest active electronically scanned radars and advanced data link and satellite communication capabilities, functioning as network nodes. More airframes are being produced every year. By contrast, the US Air Force operates only 16 serviceable AWACS aircraft, which are the near-obsolete and severely worn E-3G Sentries. Plans to replace this rapidly diminishing fleet with the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail were canceled by Secretary Hegseth in June 2025, citing cost overruns, delays, and concerns about operational vulnerability. While Congress included $400 million to continue the program in a bipartisan bill to end the US government shutdown in November, the program, even if it survives, is likely to be scaled back and still faces significant delays. This means the US will face a gap in airborne sensors, networking, and battlefield management nodes compared to China for at least the next decade. Although both nations are pursuing advanced space-based sensor and networking capabilities, these are not yet ready to replace the role of AWACS itself. The uncomfortable truth is that there are no easy answers to the challenges posed by China’s increasing air, naval, and missile capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. At an overwhelming level, the US relies on its air force and navy to credibly deter a Chinese military attack on Taiwan or elsewhere. It is impossible to fundamentally restructure the joint force to meet this threat in the next few years. Attempts to mimic the drone-centric approach in Ukraine on a massive scale will not solve the problem. US military and political leaders must instead focus on closing the growing gaps in existing conventional air and naval power. To do this, Washington has little choice but to invest urgently and massively in dramatically expanding production capacity and rapidly procuring existing long-range air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-ground missiles, as well as F-35, F-47, and B-21 fighters, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. Addressing these critical shortfalls will require either massive budget increases—unlikely in the current climate—or significant cuts in other areas of the joint force structure. However, if the United States fails to maintain air and naval superiority in the core conflict zone, the rest of its military force structure will struggle to project meaningful combat power against China in the Indo-Pacific. Millions of battlefield quadcopters and tens of thousands of disposable attack drones have not helped Russia defeat Ukraine, or vice versa. Even if the US DoD acquires similar capabilities, they will not shift the rapidly deteriorating balance of power against China in the Indo-Pacific, no matter how impressive AI-powered drone swarms look on a PowerPoint slide.
"Everyone agrees drone mania is silly, comparing it to the 'missile dope' era. But for Korea, we just need them to spot targets for our superior artillery, because carrying heavier 6.8mm ammo would totally screw our infantry."
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