ECFR Report: Predicted Russian Invasion Scenarios for Estonia

(TL;DR included) https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/The-bear-in-the-Baltics-Reassessing-the-Russian-threat-in-Estonia.pdf The ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations) policy report titled [The Bear in the Baltics: Reassessing the Russian Threat in Estonia] breaks down the possibility of a Russian invasion, Estonia's current state of readiness, and long-term response guidelines. Russia has been amping up tensions by violating NATO airspace since September, and many analysts predict they'll start seriously testing NATO around 2027. Since the Baltic states are right on Russia's doorstep, a Russian 'miscalculation' or 'overconfidence' could lead to a military clash at any time. ECFR predicts that after wrapping up the war in Ukraine, Russia will need 5 to 10 years of prep time before they can attack NATO. After 3 years of war, the Russian military has suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties and lost massive amounts of gear. Meanwhile, Estonia is beefing up its defense budget like crazy to prepare for an invasion. First off, Estonia is bringing in Korean K-9 Howitzers, deploying multiple HIMARS batteries through a joint Baltic purchase, and stockpiling enough ammo to survive the first few days of a high-intensity blitz. They've also built a reserve system of about 85,000 troops and a high-level civil defense system, prepping not just the military but the whole society for an invasion.

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Here are the points Estonia has analyzed from the Ukraine invasion and applied to their own defense strategy: 1. Defensive Edge Thanks to modern drone-linked multi-layered defense lines, the advantage for the defender has become way more prominent. Estonia is mostly flat, but it's full of forests and lakes that block large-scale advances, making it a death trap for mechanized units. 2. Artillery and Ammo Ukraine proved that having a massive artillery force and enough stockpiled ammo is essential for maintaining a stalemate or stopping a breakthrough. 3. Prepping for Hybrid Tactics Since the Russian military uses not just regular warfare but also cyberattacks, sabotage, and border provocations, they need clear response guidelines for these 'gray zone' tactics. 4. Total Society Resistance Just like the voluntary pushback from Ukrainian citizens, resistance from civil defense and regular people is key to deterring an invasion. (Local resistance in Ukraine was a huge factor in slowing down the initial Russian advance, though it was also the reason behind the massacres in Bucha and Izyum.) However, Estonia still has vulnerabilities. Their land is tiny and the border is huge, so major cities and infrastructure are exposed the second an invasion starts. A 'give up and retake later' strategy isn't an option given the massacres and sabotage Russia would pull, forcing a 'don't give up an inch' defense strategy. Also, Estonia doesn't have its own fighter jets, and the path for NATO reinforcements could be cut off at the Suwalki Gap (the Lithuania-Poland border). A small nation of 1.4 million can't realistically field enough troops to stop a Russian onslaught alone. ECFR predicts two main scenarios for a Russian invasion of Estonia.

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Scenario 1: Full-scale Invasion and a Strike on the Capital In this case, Russia goes for a full-scale military invasion to shock NATO and test their response capability. Roughly 40,000 Russian troops stationed along the Baltic coast would clash with 43,000 Estonian ground troops. Russia would deploy massive engineering units and amphibious gear to cross the Narva River, their first big hurdle. This would be the clearest, early-detectable target. The moment of crossing is when the attacker is most vulnerable, so they have to be spotted early and hit with concentrated fire to stop them. (The example cited is the Russian 90th Guards Tank Division losing an entire battalion while trying to cross the Siverskyi Donets River.) Once across the river, they'd have to advance through 200km of open terrain in the Narva Corridor. Russia would need to secure the corridor and take the border city of Narva within 48 hours—before NATO reinforcements arrive. The win/loss here depends on how fast Russia can break through 'kill zones' made of drones, mines, and K-9 Howitzer fire. Russia's goal would be to take Narva and push to the capital, Tallinn, making the occupation a done deal before NATO Article 5 is even triggered. If Estonia manages to hold the initial line, NATO reinforcements from Poland and Germany would be dispatched within two days at the earliest. If the defense fails, the Western security system collapses. The report ranks Scenario 1 as having a low success rate since they'd have to punch through the Baltics' rapid mobilization and NATO air support to reach Tallinn within 48 hours. The expected result is Russia occupying Narva or parts of Kohtla-Jarve for a few days before being forced out.

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Scenario 2 is more cunning and threatening than a full-scale war. This scenario applies the 2014 Crimea model, which worked well for Russia. The population of the border city Narva is 90% ethnic Russian, and 37% of the total population are Russian citizens. Russia would exploit this by flooding Estonia’s internet with deepfakes and rumors about discrimination against Russian speakers. After disrupting government services with cyberattacks, they’d incite riots disguised as radical protests by small pro-Russian groups. Controlled by the GRU, these groups would try to seize city halls, police stations, and bridges. Within hours, 'unidentified troops' in unmarked uniforms (company-sized) would cross the border to 'protect Russian citizens,' securing bridges, substations, and runways. Moscow would then present a 'negotiation' to NATO regarding this 'regional uprising,' trying to force concessions to avoid a total war. This scenario is way more likely and deadly. The response strategy is inevitably more ambiguous and complex. Since it's hard to identify the attackers, the Russian involvement needs to be caught early through open-source tracking and integrated intelligence. Polls show that Russia’s excuses for the Ukraine war are overwhelmingly rejected, so any sudden public agitation would be noticed fast. If NATO intel picks up on the infiltration and urban combat quickly, Article 5 would be triggered immediately. Since it wouldn't be a full-scale war yet, Europe’s dependence on the US would still be relatively low at this stage. The success of this scenario depends entirely on surprise and chaos. Estonia is currently keeping a very close watch on the Narva border for this very reason.

Related Factor: The Shrinking Role of the US Europe is most worried about a strategic US absence. The US might be reluctant to get actively involved in European affairs to focus on domestic politics or shifts in Asia. Even a vague stance from the US could make Russia miscalculate and see an opening to attack. Therefore, the report suggests these specific actions: 1. Move away from a US-led defense system; European countries must gain the ability to command and supply operations independently. 2. Run regular, large-scale joint exercises among European NATO members to send a strong warning to Russia against hybrid provocations or full-scale invasions. 3. During the 5-10 year 'golden time' while Russia rebuilds its military, Europe must boost ammo production and fully integrate advanced weapon systems. Many analysts see a Baltic invasion as very likely, regardless of whether Russia actually succeeds. If Europe’s military posture isn't prepared immediately, this will become an even more certain reality. Summary 1. Russia will seriously test NATO around 2027–2028. 2. Predicted scenarios: A full-scale invasion to suppress Estonia, or a 'Crimea 2.0' where they use disinformation and pro-Russian groups to cause riots, then send in 'unmarked' troops to secure the border. 3. During the 5-10 year golden window while Russia recovers from the Ukraine war, Europe needs to prep by stockpiling ammo, systematizing joint exercises, and modernizing their forces.